Reality-Aware Social Choice by Shapiro, Ehud & Talmon, Nimrod
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
10
11
7v
8 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  1
6 M
ay
 20
19
Reality-Aware Social Choice∗
Ehud Shapiro Nimrod Talmon
May 17, 2019
Abstract
Social Choice theory generalizes voting on one proposal to ranking
multiple proposals. Yet, while a vote on a single proposal has the status
quo (Reality) as a default, Reality has been forsaken during this gener-
alization. Here, we propose to restore this default social state and to
incorporate Reality explicitly into Social Choice. We show that doing so
gives rise to a new theory, complete with its domain restrictions, voting
rules with their Reality-aware axiomatic properties, and certain game-
theoretic aspects. In particular, we show how Reality can be used in a
principled way to break Condorcet cycles and develop an efficient Reality-
aware Condorcet-consistent agenda. We then discuss several applications
of Reality-Aware Social Choice.
1 Introduction
When voting on a proposal one in fact chooses between two alternatives: (i) A
new hypothetical social state depicted by the proposal and (ii) the status quo
or the present reality (henceforth: Reality); a Yes vote favors a transition to
the proposed hypothetical state, while a No vote favors Reality.1
The standard model of Social Choice, while generalizing from voting on one
proposal to voting on several proposals, does not give any special consideration
to the present social state. For example, neither Arrow [2], nor Sen [21], nor
Black [11] incorporate Reality into their models; the same holds for the textbook
on Computational Social Choice [18]. Here we propose a new model of Social
Choice that incorporates Reality explicitly as an ever-present, always-relevant,
and evolving social state, distinguished from hypothetical social states.
∗A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the BlueSky track of the 17th Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS ’17) [26].
1 We capitalize Reality to denote that it is a variable that has a value — the present state of
affairs — that can change over time, as as reality changes due to our decisions and actions, as
well as external events. See discussions below on Possible Worlds Semantics and Democratic
Action Plans. Furthermore, we prefer Reality over the status quo to emphasize our view that
this social state is evolving.
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Distinguished – In the words of Arrow’s later-years comment:
“... an important empirical truth, especially about legislative matter
rather than the choice of candidates: The status quo does have a
built-in edge over all alternative proposals.” [3, Page 95]
James Buchanan, another Social Choice luminary, stated that:
“The uniqueness of the status quo lies in the simple fact of its exis-
tence. [...] This elementary distinction between the status quo and
its idealized alternatives is often overlooked. [...] Any proposal for
change involves the status quo as the necessary starting point.” ([6],
p.75)
Ever-present – since every voter should have the opportunity to prefer the
status quo over some or all other proposed alternatives. This opportunity is
necessarily available when voting on a single alternative—chosen by voting No—
and there can be no justification for revoking this right when the number of
alternatives increases. Yet, the standard model of Social Choice, by failing to
incorporate the status quo as an ever-present alternative, effectively allows those
who set up a vote to veto the status quo.
For example, the governing body may decide unilaterally that a change
is needed and offer a closed list of proposed changes to the public. Then,
seemingly-democratically, proceed with the winning proposal, but without al-
lowing the public to oppose the governing body’s unilateral decision that a
change is needed or, equivalently, without allowing the voters to oppose all
government-sponsored proposals for change, by voting for the status quo.
In this sense, the requirement to incorporate the status quo as an alternative
when voting on a closed list of proposals is reminiscent of Dodgson’s suggestion
to incorporate a fictitious protest candidate in elections, in order to allow a
voter to oppose all proposed candidates [10]. In the same vein, Clark Kerr has
aptly stated more than half a century ago that:
“the status quo is the only solution that cannot be vetoed.” [16]
Indeed, failing to incorporate the status quo as an ever-present alternative ef-
fectively allows those who set up a vote the choice to veto the status quo.
With hindsight, we find it peculiar that such a basic desideratum, arguably a
basic civic right, could have been bypassed for so long by Social Choice theory.
Indeed, Social Choice theory considers also situations which are unrelated to
civic rights, such as, e.g., helping a group of people to select a restaurant for
dinner, or select which pizza to order. Our view is that even in such situations, a
default or opt-out alternative must be provided, e.g. stay home, when selecting
from a closed list of restaurants, or stay hungry, when selecting from a closed
list of dishes. Not offering such a default must be an indication that those who
set up the vote have decided, possibly non-democratically, that opting out is
not an option.
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Always-relevant – as the ranking of hypothetical social states critically de-
pends on Reality: Real voters do not rank hypothetical social states in the
abstract; they live in a particular Reality, thus when ranking alternatives to
it they in fact rank transitions from Reality to the hypothetical social states
depicted by the alternatives.
As stated by Buchanan:
“... the choice is never carte blanche. The choice among alternative
structures [...] is between what is and what might be.” ([6] ibid)
Rational evaluation of such a transition from Reality requires comparing
the utility of the hypothetical social state to that of the present Reality, and
estimating the cost of realizing the hypothetical social state given Reality.
Evolving – as the present social state—Reality—changes over time, and could
change even when the set of alternatives remains intact. E.g., democratic com-
munities endeavor that such changes be commensurate with the will of their
people. This view can be the basis for democratic action plans (Section 3.1),
which start with the present Reality and proceed only in transitions that have
sufficient support.
Example 1. As a concrete example of the role of Reality in social choice,
consider choosing a location for a public building such as a hospital. We first
consider the scenario of moving an existing hospital to a new location. Clearly,
if only one location is proposed, then the choice is between moving the hospital
and retaining it in its existing location. Offering more than one location should
not be used as a pretense to “veto the status quo” (cf. Kerr), hence, according
to Reality-Aware Social Choice, the option to retain the status quo should be
present even if multiple new locations are offered for a vote. Furthermore, voter
preferences might change depending on the present location of the hospital.
Now consider the scenario of electing a location for a new hospital. If only one
location is offered for a vote, then clearly the vote would be between this location
and no location. Hence, similarly to the scenario of relocating a hospital, “no
location”, or “protest” (see discussion of Protest candidate below) should still
be one of the alternatives offered when more than one location is put for a vote.
Example 2. One scenario to consider is novel legislation in an area where
there is none, with the extreme example being the writing of a constitution
when a political system abandons a dictatorial regime and attempts to become
a democratic one. If the body that proposes this new legislation aims to obtain
democratic support for it, then the alternative against which the proposal is
voted upon is the present reality, in which there is no legislation or no con-
stitution. Even if several alternatives are presented to voters to choose from,
our arguments above dictate that the null alternative, of no legislation or no
constitution, must also be present. Should the null alternative be chosen, the
proposers can go back to the drafting board and come back with better proposals
that may win democratic support.
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1.1 Related Work
Richelson [20] proposes axioms requiring that a winning state shall win over the
status quo by a majority; discusses corresponding voting rules; and considers
repeated elections where the status quo might change. He also provides the
following example demonstrating how ignoring the status quo might result in
intuitively unaccepted choices.
Example 3 ([20]). Consider an election over {a, b, c, s} with s being the status
quo, and the following votes: 3 votes with a ≻ s ≻ b ≻ c, 4 votes with c ≻ s ≻
a ≻ b, and 2 votes with b ≻ s ≻ c ≻ a. Then, Plurality would choose c as the
winner, even though a majority prefers the status quo (s) over c.
Grofman [15] considers the status quo in the context of spatial voting, where
people correspond to ideal positions on a line and vote by averaging their ideal
position on that line with the position of the status quo; thus, in particular,
when Reality changes, their preferences change as well.
Gibbard et al. [13] and Yanovskaya [27] also consider distinguished social
states; specifically, they study social choice functions in which some predefined
set of alternatives must be contained in any feasible set. In their model Reality
can be given as a distinguished alternative, however it does not change, but is
merely present as an indistinguishable alternative.
We also mention work on the status quo effect [5].
Lastly, we mention the Amendment agenda [18], employed by Anglo-American
legislatures, in which voting is carried out sequentially on each amendment given
the status quo, which is continuously updated by each approved amendment.
1.2 Structure of the Paper
Section 2 formally describes the model of Reality-aware Social Choice. In doing
so we discuss Reality-aware Social Choice Functions (Section 2.1) as well as voter
preferences (Section 2.2) including certain domain restriction on such Reality-
aware voter preferences (Section 2.3).
Section 3 discusses the underlying semantics of possible worlds together with
their related game-theoretic aspects of democratic action plans (Section 3.1).
Section 4 discusses Reality-aware Condorcet criteria including a description of
an efficient Reality-aware Condorcet-consistent agenda (Section 4.2). Section 6,
end the paper with a discussion of applications of Reality-Aware Social Choice
(Section 5) and further research directions stemming from this work.
We believe the main contribution of the paper is the introduction of a formal
model of Reality-aware social choice, which consists of an adaptation of social
choice functions and a novel definition of Reality-aware voter preferences. The
formal model is accompanied with a semantics of possible worlds and a formal
game which is relevant for a particular type of domain restriction of voter prefer-
ences. As we demonstrate and discuss in Section 5, several applications emerge
from the model of Reality-Aware Social Choice described here.
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2 Formal Model of Reality-Aware Social Choice
We first discuss our main definition, that of Reality-Aware Social Choice Func-
tions (RASCFs). Later in this section we discuss Reality-aware voter preferences
together with certain domain restrictions on these types of preferences.
2.1 Reality-Aware Social Choice Functions (RASCFs)
In the standard model of social choice, the pivotal definition of a social choice
function (SCF) is as follows.
Definition 1 (SCF). Let A be a set of alternatives and let L(A) be the set
containing all linear orders on A. Then, a social choice function (SCF) is a
function f : L(A)n → A.
That is, an SCF takes n votes, each being a linear order over the same set of
alternatives, and returns one alternative as the winner of the election. Here, we
extend this definition and define Reality-aware social choice function (RASCF),
to take not only n votes but also a Reality as an input, as defined next.
Definition 2 (RASCF). Let A be a set of alternatives and let L(A) be the set
containing all linear orders on A. Then, a Reality-aware social choice function
(RASCF) is a function f : L(A)n ×A→ A.
Remark 1. It is possible to similarly define a Reality-aware Social Welfare
Functions. For focus considerations, we however do not consider such functions
in this paper.
2.2 Reality-aware Voter Preferences
The definition given above of Reality-aware social choice functions is our basic
definition. Notice, however, that it considers a specific Reality one at a time.
Below we are concerned with voter preferences as they relate to a changing
Reality. That is, we assume that voters have possibly different preferences for
different realities, and we are concerned with how their preferences change as
the reality changes. Our basic definition of voter preferences in our model is as
follows.
Definition 3 (Reality-aware voter preferences). Given a set of alternatives A,
the Reality-aware voter preferences of voter v are defined via a function fv such
that fv : A→ L(A).
That is, for each possible Reality R, fv(R) is the linear order representing
the preferences of voter v if and when the Reality is R. Notice the difference
with the standard model of Social Choice, in which voter preferences are given
as a single linear order; in our model, a voter is associated not only with one
linear order, but with several, one for each possible Reality.
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Remark 2. Indeed, here we consider the ordinal model of elections, where
voters provide linear orders. Adapting other elicitation methods into our model
is of course possible but we do not discuss such adaptations here.
Remark 3. To the best of our knowledge, there is no natural way to reduce our
model of Reality-aware Social Choice to the standard setting of social choice.
This is especially apparent in view of Definition 3 of Reality-aware voter pref-
erences. Indeed, there does not seem to be a natural reduction of this type of
preferences to standard ordinal preferences.
2.3 Domain Restrictions
While it might make sense to consider arbitrary Reality-aware voter preferences,
next we consider several domain restrictions, by restricting those functions which
define the voter linear order for each possible Reality. Indeed, formally we view
the following as domain restrictions, as they restrict the allowed preferences
of the voters. We also mention that some of these restrictions give rise to
certain models by which voter preferences can be constructed (similarly to,
say, single-peaked preferences in the standard model of Social Choice). Other
domain restrictions can be defined, of course. Here we aim to delve into the
structure of Reality-aware voter preferences to gain further understanding of
them and the demonstrate the richness of the Reality-aware Social Choice model.
A certain usage of one of the domain restrictions we consider below is discussed
in Section 3.1.
2.3.1 Abstract Constancy Preferences
We begin with the least domain restriction, which requires the following kind of
constancy: If one craves for a particular state of affairs independently of Reality,
then once this wish is fulfilled and this state becomes Reality, the craving should
be satisfied.
For a Reality R, an alternative s, and a voter v, we denote the position of
alternative s in the linear order fv(R) by posfv(R)(s). For example, if v prefers
s the most when the Reality is R, then posfv(R)(s) = 1.
Definition 4 (Abstract Constancy Preferences). We say that the preferences
of voter v ∈ V satisfy abstract constancy if the following hold for each social
state s ∈ S: If posfv(R)(s) = 1 for each R ∈ S \ {s}, then posfv(s)(s) = 1.
A Reality-aware election satisfies abstract constancy if the preferences of
each voter v ∈ V satisfy abstract constancy.
In other words, abstract constancy requires that if a state s is ranked first
in fv(R) for any R ∈ S \ {s}, then s is also ranked first in fvs.
Remark 4. Notice that, if there is only one possible Reality, then the above
restriction holds (in the empty sense, since S \ {s} = ∅). In this sense, voter
preferences in the standard model of Social Choice satisfy abstract constancy.
Furthermore, even if there are several possible Realities, then even though S \
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{s} = ∅, simply letting fv(s) = fv(s′) for each voter v ∈ V and each pair of
social states s, s′ gives a Reality-aware election that satisfies abstract constancy.
Again, it follows that voter preferences in the standard model of Social Choice
satisfy abstract constancy.
Observe that the definition above is indeed a domain restriction, as (similarly
to, say, single-peakedness in standard Social Choice) it restricts the (Reality-
aware) voter preferences. We view this restriction as a sanity check, namely as
a very weak restriction which usually shall be satisfied.
Next we consider further, more restricted domain restrictions.
2.3.2 Distance Constancy Preferences
Below we consider a further restriction on the domain of Reality-aware voter
preferences, based on the social cost of transitioning from Reality to hypothetical
social states. In addition to voters V , social states S with changing Reality R,
and rankings vR, we assume that there is a distance d over S. Formally, it is a
pseudoquasimetric d : S×S → N, satisfying (1) d(s, s′) ≥ 0 for all s, s′ ∈ S; (2)
d(s, s) = 0 for all s ∈ S; and (3) d(s, s′′) ≤ d(s, s′)+d(s′, s′′) for all s, s′, s′′ ∈ S.
For two social states s, s′ the value d(s, s′) can be viewed as the distance between
s and s′ in some abstract metric space, or as the social cost of transitioning from
s to s′. Below we consider Reality-aware voter preferences which are generated
from such a model; and we require that a voter preferring a particular state
from afar should prefer it at least as much as it gets near.
Definition 5 (Distance Constancy Preferences). Given a pseudoquasimetric
d : S × S → R, we say that the Reality-aware preferences of a voter v ∈ V
satisfy distance constancy with respect to d if the following hold for each triplet
of social states R, a, b ∈ S: If posfv(R)(a) < posfv(R)(b), then for each R
′ ∈ S
for which d(R′, a) ≤ d(R, a) and d(R′, b) ≥ d(R, b), it holds that posfv(R′)(a) <
posfv(R′)(b).
We say that a Reality-aware election satisfies distance constancy if there is
a pseudoquasimetric d for which every voter v ∈ V satisfies distance constancy.
In other words, distance constancy requires that if a is ranked above b in
fv(R), then a is ranked above b in fv(R
′) for every R′ ∈ S for which d(R′, a) ≤
d(R, a) and d(R′, b) ≥ d(R, b).
Next we show that this domain restriction is at least as restrictive as the
previous domain restriction.
Observation 1. If voter preferences satisfy distance constancy then they satisfy
abstract constancy.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume there is a voter v inv with preferences
that satisfy distance constancy for some d but not satisfy abstract constancy.
Then there is a state s for which s is ranked first in fv(R) for each R 6= s but is
not ranked first in fv(S). Consider some s
′ 6= s and notice that d(s′, s) ≥ d(s, s),
thus the fact that s is ranked higher than all other states in v′s but there is
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some state which is ranked higher than s in vs violates distance constancy. A
contradiction.
2.3.3 Utility Constancy Preferences
We consider a further restriction on the domain . We assume not only a distance
d between the social states as above, but also assume that each voter has a
state utility, denoted by Uv(S), and require that the distance d of these states
from Reality, combined with their utilities, completely define the Reality-aware
preferences of the voters.
To gain some intuition for this domain restriction, as well as a specific appli-
cation, consider selecting a budget [24]. In this case it is reasonable to assume
an objective distance between budget bundles (e.g., the total amount of funds
in the symmetric difference between two budget bundles might define such an
objective distance). Then, combined with a utility of a voter to each of the
possible budget bundles, the preferences of each voter is determined. So the
distance d to be thought of an objective distance between the states, while the
state utility values are individual for each voter, and reflect each voter’s utility
for each state s, which is oblivious to Reality. (Such an objective distance be-
tween social states might not be reasonable for, e.g., electing a winner among a
set of candidates.)
Formally, we first define a transition utility, which we then use to define the
utility constancy domain restriction.
Definition 6. Given a pseudoquasimetric d : S × S → R and a state utility
function Uv : S → R, the transition utility Tv of voter v from state s to s′ is
defined as follows: Tv(s, s
′) = Uv(s
′)− Uv(s)− d(s, s′).
That is, the utility of a certain voter for transitioning from state s to state
s′ is defined as the difference in the utility of the voter from state s′ minus its
utility for s, minus the distance to transition from state s to state s′. Intuitively,
a voter would like to move from s to s′ if the gain in utility is significant enough
to compensate for the cost of transitioning from s to s′.
Then, the preferences of voter v satisfy utility constancy if for each Reality
R and two states s, s′, it holds that voter v prefers s over s′ if the transition
utility from R to s is higher than the transition utility from R to s′. That is,
the ranking of a voter v with respect to some Reality R ∈ S is determined by
ordering the social states s ∈ S in decreasing order of their transition utilities
from Reality, namely Tv(R, s). The intuition is that transitioning to a farther
social state is more costly and hence less desirable. A formal definition follows.
Definition 7 (Utility Constancy Preferences). Given a distance d and for each
voter v ∈ V a state utility Uv, the preferences of a voter v ∈ V satisfies utility
constancy with respect to d and Uv, if for each Reality R and two states s, s
′,
it holds that posfv(R)(s) < posfv(R)(s
′) if and only if Tv(R, s) > Tv(R, s
′).
We say that a Reality-aware election satisfies utility constancy if there is a
distance d and for each voter v ∈ V a utility function Uv such that the Reality-
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aware preferences of every v ∈ V satisfy utility constancy with respect to d
and Uv.
Next we show that this domain restriction is as restricted as the previous
ones.
Observation 2. If voter preferences satisfy utility constancy then they satisfy
distance constancy and abstract constancy.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume there is a voter v ∈ v with prefer-
ences that satisfy utility constancy for some distance d and utility Uv, but not
distance constancy for d. Then there are Realities R, R′ and states a, b for
which d(R′, a) ≤ d(R, a), d(R′, b) ≥ d(R, b), posfv(R)(a) < posfv(R)(b), but
posfv(R′)(a) > posfv(R′)(b).
Since v prefers a over b for Reality R, it follows that Tv(R, a) < Tv(R, b).
Thus, Tv(R, a) = Uv(a)−Uv(R)−d(R, a) < Uv(b)−Uv(R)−d(R, b) = Tv(R, b).
It follows that Uv(a) − d(R, a) < Uv(b) − d(R, b). Similarly, since v prefers b
over a for Reality R′, it follows that Tv(R
′, a) > Tv(R
′, b) and thus Uv(a) −
d(R′, a) > Uv(b) − d(R′, b). Plugging in the facts that d(R′, a) ≤ d(R, a) and
d(R′, b) ≥ d(R, b) we reach a contradiction.
3 Possible Worlds and Democratic Action Plans
In this section we discuss semantics for Reality-Aware Social Choice. Specifi-
cally, in Reality-Aware Social Choice, each social state s ∈ S can be viewed as
a possible world (see, e.g., [7]), where Reality R ∈ S is the state corresponding
to a possible world that is the actual world, namely the world in which the vote
on S takes place. If a social state s 6= R wins, this means that society aims to
change Reality from R to s. If successful, then the subsequent vote may take
place in the possible world (i.e., with Reality being) s. Indeed, in this view,
our Reality-Aware Social Choice Functions are functions which take voter pref-
erences with respect to the possible world which we are at now, and elects the
possible world to transition to.
This view of possible worlds and the possible transitions among them gives
rise to democratic action plans, which are (possibly infinite) sequences of states
where (i) the first state is the present Reality; and (ii) when Reality equals a
state in the sequence, then the following state wins the vote (or ties) in that
state. A democratic action plan need not be executed blindly to completion, but
should be evaluated at each step, accommodating gaps between estimated and
actual efforts of transitioning from one state to another, changes of heart, and
recent real-world, external events. Still, a democratic action plan may provide
a long term vision and blueprint for a democratic community that is useful and
reassuring, while being consistent with the immediate action to be taken at any
point in time.
A democratic action plan offers an incremental path from the present Reality
with the property that each incremental choice along the way has democratic
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support. Some state transitions may not be feasible. If a transition from s to
s′ is infeasible or, using possible-worlds terminology, s′ is not accessible from
s, then s′ should not be offered as an alternative when voting in the possible
world s.
Computing a democratic action plan requires eliciting from each voter the
ranking of all states with Reality being each state in the plan, except the last.
As this may be difficult, one might consider unfolding democratic action plans,
in which the society computes only a few steps ahead. This seems reasonable as
a society can anyhow peer so much into the future. In particular, it may not be
plausible to assume that voters can predict what their preferences will be when
the new Reality is far away from the present one.
A democratic action plan requires a voting rule that determines when one
state is preferred over another, given the Reality. We discuss Reality-aware
Condorcet-consistent voting rules below, as well as an efficient Reality-aware
Condorcet-consistent agenda.
Notice that a democratic action plan, if unbounded, might not converge, as
the following example demonstrates.
Example 4. Consider three social states: a, b, and c, and a single voter v.
Assume that the ranking of v when Reality is a is va = b ≻ c ≻ a; her ranking
when Reality is b is vb = c ≻ a ≻ b; and her ranking when Reality is c is
vc = a ≻ b ≻ c. Then, even though our Constancy axiom (i.e., Definition 4)
(vacuously) holds, we nevertheless have a cyclic, thus infinite democratic action
plan: To see this, assume that a is the initial Reality. Then, the society would
move to b, then to c, and back to a.
3.1 Game-Theoretic Consequences
Here we discuss game-theoretic consequences of our model. Specifically, Reality-
aware Social Choice, supplied with such democratic action plans as discussed
above, allows for a more realistic study of strategic behavior of voters. For con-
creteness, consider a utility constancy election in which the objective distance d
and the individual state utilities Uv are known. This suggests an iterative
game, pictorially played on the following graph (this game might be thought of
a strategic game on top of a democratic action plan over the model of Utility-
based Reality-aware Social Choice): The game graph G has a vertex a for each
social state a ∈ S and is a complete arc-weighted directed graph, where the
weight of the arc (a, b) equals the distance from a to b, according to d (i.e.,
w(a, b) = d(a, b) for each a, b ∈ S). In each turn, the current Reality is repre-
sented by a pebble placed on one vertex, and each voter is a player. Assume,
for simplicity, that the players know the metric d and the state utilities of all
players. The game is played repeatedly, where in each turn all players specify
their strategic rankings which might not correspond to their real transition util-
ities, as the pay-off of each player equals the state utility of that player from
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the Reality at the end of the game2 (so behaving strategically may, e.g., help
shift society to a social state this player prefers less, in the hope of more easily
being able to shift the society from that state to a more preferable state).
4 Reality-Aware Condorcet-Consistency
Next we incorporate Reality into two classical concepts – the 18th-century Cri-
terion of the Marquis de Condorcet and the 12th-century Amendment Agenda
of Ramon Lull. First, we discuss how incorporating Reality into Condorcet
criteria can cope with Condorcet cycles in a natural way, resulting in simple
one-sentence voting rules that can be easily explained to voters. Then, we show
how incorporating Reality into the Amendment Agenda can produce a simple
and efficient Reality-aware Condorcet consistent voting process, that can be
realized simply by show of hands and computer-less note taking.
4.1 Reality-Aware Axiomatic Properties
Here we consider several axiomatic properties of voting rules that use Reality.
As our voting rules are defined via Reality-aware Social Choice Functions, we
use the term Reality-aware voting rule to formally mean a Reality-aware Social
Choice Function. In this section we focus on axiomatic properties related to the
Condorcet principle.
The first use of Reality should be to eliminate all alternatives not preferred
over it – why bother with an alternative that the majority considers inferior to
the status quo?
Definition 8 (Reality-viable Alternatives). Let S be a set of alternatives and
R ∈ S the Reality. An alternative s ∈ S is Reality-viable if s beats R (i.e., if more
voters prefer s over R than vice versa). The set of Reality-viable alternatives is
denoted by SR.
Correspondingly, what is perhaps the simplest axiomatic property desired
from a voting rule that uses Reality is that it shall elect a Reality-viable alter-
native, if there is one, else elect Reality.
Definition 9 (Reality-viable Criterion). Let S be a set of alternatives with
R ∈ S the Reality. A Reality-aware voting rule satisfies Reality-viable criterion
if it elects R whenever SR = ∅, and else elects a member of SR.
In the standard model of Social Choice, the Condorcet criterion states that
an alternative preferred to all others by a voter majority shall be elected as a
winner, called the Condorcet winner. A winner might not exist due to Condorcet
cycles. The criterion treats all social states equally, and hence any method for
breaking cycles among them may seem arbitrary. However, once Reality is
2In fact, a more careful formulation of the game might be that it is played until convergence;
or, that the players’ pay-off is averaged over the course of the game.
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recognized as a distinguished social state, it may be used to eschew or break
cycles and in either case identify a winner. Several approaches of increasing
complexity can take Reality to the task of addressing Condorcet cycles:
1. Elect Reality, that is, retain the status quo: If voters cannot clearly decide
what alternative they prefer over Reality, as manifested by a Condorcet
cycle among the alternatives preferred over Reality, then retaining Reality
is a safe, albeit conservative, bet.
2. Being more permissive, elect an arbitrary winner among all alternatives
preferred over Reality.
3. Being less arbitrary, elect the alternative most preferred over Reality.
4. Employ a distance over social states, if available (e.g., if voter preferences
satisfy distance constancy and the underlying distance is known), to elect
the alternative closest to Reality among those preferred over Reality.
5. Employ one’s favorite tournament solution [19] to elect a member of the
solution to the tournament among the alternatives preferred over Reality.
All these approaches are rephrased below as Reality-aware Condorcet crite-
ria. They all generalize the classical, Reality-oblivious, Condorcet criterion. The
first one is the following, most conservative criterion, which translates directly
into a Reality-aware voting rule.
Definition 10 (Conservative Reality-aware Condorcet Criterion). Let S be
a set of alternatives with R ∈ S being the Reality. A Reality-aware voting
rule satisfies the Conservative Reality-aware Condorcet criterion if it elects the
Condorcet winner of SR whenever it exists, and elects R otherwise.
Next is a less conservative option, which, in the absence of a Condorcet
winner among the Reality-viable alternatives, suggests electing some alternative
preferred over the status quo.
Definition 11 (Permissive Reality-aware Condorcet Criterion). Let S be a set
of alternatives with R ∈ S the Reality. A Reality-aware voting rule satisfies the
Permissive Reality-aware Condorcet criterion if it elects the Condorcet winner
of SR if it exists; elects some member of SR whenever SR 6= ∅ and there is no
Condorcet winner among SR; and elects R if SR = ∅.
Observe that corresponding Conservative/Permissive Reality-aware Con-
dorcet voting rules can be defined directly to adhere to these Conservative/Permissive
Reality-aware Condorcet criteria. These Reality-aware Condorcet-consistent
voting rules are sufficiently simple to be stated in one sentence and to be com-
puted manually. For concreteness, the first one is: Among the alternatives
preferred over the status quo, if one is preferred over all others then elect it.
Else retain the status quo. Indeed, such simplicity means that these rules are
easily communicable and therefore might be considered more trustworthy by
the voters.
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The next criterion suggests to resolve cycles based on the net preference of
its members over Reality.
Definition 12 (Preference-over-Reality Condorcet Criterion). Let S be a set
of alternatives with R ∈ S the Reality. A Reality-aware voting rule satisfies
the Preference-over-Reality Condorcet criterion if it elects R whenever RS = ∅;
elects the Condorcet winner of RS whenever it exists; and elects a member
of W = {argmaxs∈SR NR(s)} otherwise, where NR(s) denotes the number of
voters preferring s to R minus the number of voters preferring R to s.
The above criterion is not only logically sound but has a psychological ap-
peal, as we discuss next. All alternatives, except Reality, relate to hypothetical
social states. A comparison of a hypothetical state to Reality is easier mentally
and is more trustworthy than a comparison among two hypothetical states,
as the latter requires more hypothesizing and imagining. In the absence of a
Reality-viable Condorcet winner, our criterion elects a winner by employing only
comparisons with Reality, hence we argue that it is psychologically more sound
than criteria that rely on comparisons among hypothetical states. Concretely,
observe that a cycle of hypothetical social states is even less trustworthy. To
illustrate this point, assume that a voter’s judgment of two hypothetical social
states is faulty with probability p. Then, the probability that there are no voter
judgment faults in a cycle containing, say, z social states, is (1 − p)z, which
diminishes exponentially in z.
Last, we mention that the above Reality-aware Condorcet criteria can be
refined to consider any tournament solution (e.g., top cycle, uncovered set, etc.).
For example, it is possible to consider a Reality-aware Condorcet criterion that
requires to select an element of the top cycle of SR whenever SR 6= ∅, and R
otherwise. For more background on tournament solutions, we refer the reader
to Moulin [19].
We do not feel compelled to explore complications of the criteria arising from
selecting a winner from a tournament solution at this time, especially since this
would entail further comparisons among hypothetical states, which are both
laborious to the voters (compared to the Reality-aware Amendment Agenda,
see below), less trustworthy, and with what may be a marginal benefit. In
particular, it is possible that all members of a top-cycle are equally preferred
over Reality. In such an extreme case, we feel that it is quite justified to resolve
the tie among them arbitrarily, as indeed the voters will be equally happy with
a transition from Reality to any of them.
In case the distance metric is generally known (e.g., in a specific election
satisfying Utility constancy; see Section 2.3), the distance from Reality can also
be used to break Condorcet cycles, as follows.
Definition 13 (Distance-from-Reality Condorcet Criterion). Let S be a set
of alternatives with R ∈ S the Reality. A Reality-aware voting rule satisfies
the Distance-from-Reality Condorcet criterion if it elects R whenever RS = ∅;
elects the Condorcet winner of RS whenever it exists; and elects a member of
W = {argmins∈C d(s,R)} otherwise.
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Observe that the Distance-from-Reality Condorcet criterion defined above
does not rely on subjective voter judgments to break cycles, but only on the
(presumably) objective distance measure, if available.
Remark 5. As noted by Arrow [3, Page 95], the special default role Reality may
play in voting on issues does have a natural counterpart when voting on candi-
dates. To rectify for the lack of a default alternative, Dodgson [10] suggested
to add a fictitious protest, or scarecrow candidate, to allow voters to protest
against an inadequate list of candidates. Clearly, the winner of an election
must at least win over a brainless scarecrow; if not, the elections are annulled.
Observe how this view corresponds to our Condorcet criteria defined above, by
referring to a set of candidates containing a default scarecrow candidate, instead
of a set of social states that include Reality.
Remark 6. We note on the relation of our model, and specifically our Con-
dorcet criteria, to Arrow’s theorem. Indeed, Gibbard et al. [13] have shown that
Arrow’s theorem does not hold in a model very much similar to ours: In their
model there is a distinguished social state which is present in every election.
In particular, they considered the following voting rule, originally proposed by
Richelson [20]: It considers only the social states that are preferred over the
distinguished social state (Reality-viable alternatives in our terminology) and
breaks ties by serial dictatorship. Indeed, the distinguished social state is used
to break Condorcet cycles in a principled way, in particular resulting in a voting
rule that is not completely dictatorial, but nevertheless has visible dictatorial
properties (as it employs serial dictatorship).
This result suggests considering the relation of voting rules that satisfy our
Condorcet criteria to Arrow’s theorem. First, observe that the rule considered
by Richelson [20] and Gibbard et al. [13] satisfies our Reality-viable criterion
(Definition 9).
As for our Conservative Reality-aware Condorcet criterion, observe that any
voting rule that satisfies this criterion violates Unanimity (i.e., if all voters prefer
some social state to another, then the social state shall be preferred to the other
in the aggregated vote). To see this, consider a profile in which all voters rank
the Reality last — if there is no Condorcet winner Reality would still be elected.
As for our other Reality-aware Condorcet criterion, we mention that Gib-
bard et al. [13] have shown that a modification of Arrow’s theorem, specifically
where Non-Dictatorship is replaced with Anonymity (namely, the voting rule
shall produce the same results, independently of reordering the voters), does
hold in their model. Thus, while our other Reality-aware Condorcet criterion
might subvert Arrow’s theorem using similar dictatorial properties as the rule
considered by Gibbard et al. [13], in essence they are bound to either violate
Anonymity, Unanimity, or Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives.
4.2 Reality-aware Amendment Agenda
The Amendment Agenda was proposed by Ramon Llull in his 1299 Des Artes
Electionis [17]: Arrange all alternatives in some order, vote the first against the
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second, the winner of the two against the third, and so on; finally, elect the final
winner. The Amendment Agenda is known to elect a Condorcet winner if there
is one, however it does not detect cycles.
Here we use this Amendment Agenda as the core of our Reality-aware
Condorcet-consistent voting processes, which corresponds naturally to our Reality-
aware Condorcet criteria. All processes consist of two stages: (i) Identify the
Reality-viable alternatives and perform the Amendment Agenda on them; (ii)
Vote the final winner against all tentative winners (except the previous one,
against which it has already won). If it wins them all, then elect it.
The specific variants of our adaptation of the Amendment Agenda to our
setting differ in how they proceed in cases in which there is no Condorcet winner
among the Reality-viable alternatives. E.g., the conservative process, which is
formally described below, simply elects Reality in this case.
Algorithm 1 (Reality-aware Conservative Amendment Agenda). Let S be the
set of alternatives with R ∈ S and let SR be the set of Reality-viable alternatives.
If SR = ∅ then elect R. Else perform an Amendment Agenda on SR starting
with R, followed by extra votes of the final winner against all other members of
SR not previously voted against, if any. If the final winner wins all these votes
then elect it. Else elect R.
Remark 7. Amendment Agendas corresponding to the other Reality-aware
Condorcet criteria described in the previous section can be obtained by revising
the final “Else”. For example, revise the final “Else” to “Else arbitrarily elect a
member of SR.” to obtain the Permissive Reality-aware Amendment Agenda;
or revise it to “Else elect from SR the alternative that wins the most over R,
breaking ties arbitrarily.” to obtain the Preference-over-Reality Amendment
Agenda. Further complicating the Agenda can produce processes that corre-
spond to other criteria, e.g. those based on tournament solutions.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 satisfies the Conservative Reality-aware Condorcet
criterion. Furthermore, the modifications described in Remark 7 correspond to
algorithms which satisfy the further Reality-aware Condorcet criteria discussed
in Section 4.
Proof. We prove the claim only for Algorithm 1, as the proof is similar for
the other agendas. There are two cases to consider, one in which there is a
Condorcet winner c among SR and two in which there is not. In the first case,
assume by way of contradiction that that c′ 6= c is elected. But this would
require d to beat c either during one of the Amendment Agenda votes on SR
performed as the first step of Algorithm 1, if c was tentatively elected before
d, or in the second step of voting it against all other alternatives of SR, final
vote if it was not, contradicting c being a Condorcet winner. Thus, in this
case Algorithm 1 will select c as the winner, as required by the Conservative
Reality-aware Condorcet criterion.
In the second case, let d be the alternative selected in the first step of Al-
gorithm 1, namely the winner of the Amendment Agenda on SR. As d is in
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particular not a Condorcet winner of SR, it will fail against one of the alterna-
tives it is voted against in step two of Algorithm 1, thus R will be selected, as
required by the Conservative Reality-aware Condorcet criterion.
Remark 8. We wish to clarify the use of the term Reality in the description of
the Reality-aware Amendment Agenda described in Algorithm 1: Here, Reality
is best understood as a variable, with an initial value being the present reality,
namely the status quo. As the algorithm progress, the value of the variable
changes. The final value is the elected alternative, which is the new Reality.
5 Applications
Since the introduction of key ideas presented here in the preliminary version
of this work [26], several applications of Reality-aware Social Choice have been
demonstrated. Here we briefly discuss them, and other, envisioned ones.
5.1 Sybil-Resilient Voting
In a majoritarian democracy, a single vote may decide the fate of elections or
tilt a decision. Such a deciding vote could, in principle, belong to a fake voter,
aka sybil. The risk of sybils infiltrating the electorate is even higher in online
democratic communities, making sybil attacks literally an existential threat to e-
democracies. Recently, Reality-Aware Social Choice was leveraged to face sybil
attacks [23]. Specifically, Shahaf et al. [23] use the status quo as the anchor of
sybil resilience, which is characterized by sybil safety - the inability of sybils to
change the status quo against the will of the genuine voters, and sybil liveness
the ability of the genuine voters to change the status quo against the will of the
sybils. They investigate the supermajority needed to ensure sybil safety, as a
function of the sybil penetration rate, and show that liveness can be assured up
to one-third sybil penetration.
Notably, the use of Reality-aware Social Choice as the foundation of their
sybil-resilient voting rules allows Shahaf et al. to bypass known lower bounds [9].
5.2 Holistic Voting Process
When several alternatives to the status quo are offered, and the majority prefers
the status quo over any of them, then, according to the Reality-aware Condorcet
criteria discussed in Section 4, the status quo shall remain. Indeed, it is possible
that an alternative with majority preference over the status quo does not exist.
But, it could also be the case that such an alternative exists but was not offered
to vote upon, due to ignorance, incompetence or the special interests of those
who set up the vote.
Such a situation is clearly distressing, as the will of the people to change the
status quo cannot be accommodated. A recent paper [22], inspired by Reality-
Aware Social Choice, describes an egalitarian process for identifying alternatives
that may have majority support over the status quo in a broad range of social
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choice settings, including ordinal elections, committee elections, participatory
budgeting and participatory legislation.
Such omission of alternatives is less likely to happen in the standard setting
of social choice, where the objects voted upon are usually quite simple, e.g.,
candidate names. In other settings of social choice, for example, in participatory
budgeting [14, 4, 12], or when deciding upon a legislation, on in participatory
legislation [1], the objects upon which the voters vote on are more complex,
and hence offering a closer list of alternatives to vote upon is more prone to
the omission of majority-supported alternatives. Such complex social choice
settings might benefit from a more holistic process than merely voting on the
available alternatives. Specifically, Reality-Aware Social Choice can be utilized
with the following idea. For concreteness, we speak of a society wishing to
amend a legislation.
Here, in a way which resembles the idea of a democratic action plan discussed
in Section 3.1, the society might start from the status quo, i.e., the current
legislation on the topic, which we term the common draft. Then, a deliberation
of possible edits and revisions to the common draft takes place, followed by
a vote, in which participants in the society vote on the suggested revisions.
The result of the vote would be a revised aggregated common draft, which
incorporates, say, those edits to the previous common draft for which there is
majority support.
While the newly aggregated common draft might be the end result, utilizing
Reality-Aware Social Choice we may let it be the new common draft (Reality),
and repeat the round of deliberation and voting. This can be continued until
some time limit is reached, or, preferably, until there is consensus, or at least
majority preference over the status quo, among the participants with regard to
the resulting common draft. The work done by Shahaf et al. [22] is a first step
towards a realization of such a holistic voting process.
6 Discussion
Augmenting the standard model of social choice by introducing Reality as a
distinguished alternative necessitates building a new foundation for this theory.
We have proposed a simple model of Reality-Aware Social Choice and considered
four domain restrictions on voter preferences in this model. We have argued
that Reality can then be used as a principled way for breaking Condorcet cycle,
described several corresponding Reality-aware Condorcet-criteria and proposed
an efficient Reality-aware Condorcet-consistent agenda. We find it particularly
satisfying that more than seven hundred years after Ramon Llull has proposed
a principled show-of-hands agenda [8], it is still possible to offer a novel and
improved computer-less agenda.
Further study of the foundations of Reality-Aware Social Choice shall be
conducted, especially in the face of its many applications, which include decision
making mechanisms for elections [22], budgeting [24], and legislation [25], and
sybil-resilient voting rules [23].
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